3 that only orders ascribable to a sovereign or his subordinates can rank as law. 12 It is equally unsatisfactory to answer that a legislature's not having abrogated a court's decision enforcing a custom shows it tacitly to approve of that decision, for it is conceivable that the legislature dislikes a decision but leaves it undisturbed because it has bigger battles to fight, say, or because it does not want to be seen as meddlesome. 13 Yet how can a custom be law, just as a statute is a law, before a court has ever pronounced on it? Because the criteria by which legal officials identify what counts as law within a particular legal system -the criteria which form the content of its "rule of recognition" -make it possible for officials to speak of customs of certain kinds as valid laws. A criterion of validity might be, for example, that a custom is to be identified as a rule of the legal system if is established as "long customary practice" 14 and if no statute or other legal source prevents legal officials from relying on this criterion to identify the custom as a legal rule.
It is by no means obvious that Hart prevailed over the classical positivists on the topic of customary law. These "customs of certain kinds" cannot be law simply by virtue of having long been practised without disturbance, Austin had observed, for there are "customs immemorially current in the nation" which "are not legally binding", just as some customs which are legally binding "had no existence till times comparatively recent". 15 The claim that a custom has the status of law sui generis by virtue of some characteristic -its longevity, its popularity, its reasonableness or whatever -is unconvincing if customs can have this status yet lack the characteristic, or if they can have the characteristic without ever being, or needing to be, recognised as law. There must be some test of recognition by which legal officials can identify customary laws (as distinct from spontaneous customs and legalised customs). Hart drew no conclusions as to what the test might be. 16 Could a legal system embody such a test? Hart's reflections on the legal status of custom ("not in the modern world a very important 'source' of law" 17 ) were understandably sketchy, for the topic was not prominent on his agenda when he rejected 12 Ibid., at p. 47. 13 Ibid., at pp. 47-8. 14 Ibid., at p. 95. 15 Austin (note 5 above), vol. II, at p. 539. 16 "Austin … held that … customary practices were not law until the courts … recognized them…. Hart reversed Austin on this point. The master rule [sc., the ultimate rule of recognition], he says, might stipulate that some custom counts as law even before the courts recognize it. But he does not face the difficulty this raises for his general theory because he does not attempt to set out the criteria a master rule might use for this purpose." Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London 1977), 42. 17 Hart (note 11 above), at p. 45.
classical positivism and made his case for a fresh start. The cursoriness of the reflections should not mask their significance, however, for they have some basis in English legal history. Particularly before the emergence of stare decisis, judges and lawyers regularly sought to explain how some customs had the status of law even though no law-maker or court had ever invested those customs with legal validity. There is to be discovered in this history no single comprehensive test for ascertaining a custom's inherent legal validity -though the identification of a custom as law often involved the proposition that it had endured since time immemorial -and the courts, which would sometimes enforce a custom even though it did not satisfy any accepted test, were hardly immune to the classical positivists' charge that they impressed customs with the character of law. But the lack of a clear-cut test, and the fact that judges would sometimes legalise customs, does not negate the possibility of a legal system's ultimate rule of recognition embodying some criterion or criteria of validity enabling the courts to identify custom as a distinct source of law. Pre-stare decisis English judges and lawyers, we will see, would typically identify a custom as innately legal -as distinct from a custom which either was not law or had been made law -by virtue of its conformity to a standard of legal validity which was itself customary in nature.
This article is not a disquisition on the general topic of law and custom. Rather, it considers how, historically, English lawyers have tended to understand and explain custom as a source of law in its own right. English legal history does not so much flesh out Hart's own laconic observations on custom as a source of law as lend credence to a general Hartian perspective on the topic. If a criterion of validity by which legal officials identify a custom as law is posited rather than customary -as would be the case, for example, with a statute providing that a customary practice establishes a legal right if it has endured substantially unaltered for the past forty years -the custom which meets with the criterion is not customary law but custom made binding by positive law. A custom which is customary law has this status because the criterion of validity enabling its identification as law is itself customary. Note how this last proposition trades on two Prescription is the standard of validity most often applied by English courts to identify a custom as binding law. Although prescription is nowadays commonly thought of as legislated rather than judicial doctrine, 20 the notion that a custom is law because it has prescribed is one which was accepted and refined in the courts and in legal writings.
The history of the doctrine, even distilled, is messy. It yields no definitive explanation of prescription as a test of custom as law (not least because there is, we will see, more than one conception of custom as law), and although custom deemed already law is invariably taken to be prescribed custom, there were differences of opinion among pre-stare decisis
English lawyers as to whether or not custom could be declared law solely on the basis of its having prescribed. 21 The history confirms, nevertheless, that a feature of the rule of customs as distinct from customs of the legal profession. Local (particular) and national (general) custom, we will see in the next section, are distinct concepts in English law. 19 See Joseph Raz, "Legal Principles and the Limits of Law" (1972) 81 Yale L.J. 823, at 852-3; also Grant Lamond, "Legal Sources, the Rule of Recognition, and Customary Law" (2014) 59 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25. Lamond's account is particularly interesting because he sees the difficulties in squaring this line of argument with what is meant to be a positivist legal theory: if customs in foro are accommodated by the rule of recognition, he observes, we have a legal system in which the rule of recognition extends to standards which courts customarily treat as binding but which are not validated by statute, precedent, a constitutional provision or any other posited source of law (ibid., at 34-5). Nevertheless, he appreciates that some squaring has to be done, because judges within municipal legal systems do enforce community customs which conform to "non-source-based" standards of legal validity (ibid., at 35). Rather than invoking the rule of recognition to explain how they do so, he argues that judges understand the nonsource-based standard as "authoritatively binding" -to be followed not because of "the merits of the standard itself" but because "it is part of the law" and so is something which they "are duty-bound to apply" (ibid., at 45). To say that judges identify community customs as having legal validity by virtue of their conformity to a standard which is "part of the law" seems to entail acceptance of the rule of recognition (modified to allow custom in foro to feature in its content). The point for emphasis is that Lamond, like Raz, accepts that judges try to identify community custom as law (rather than turn community custom into law) when they declare its conformity to a standard of legal validity which is accepted as customary law of the courts. 20 Under the Prescription Act 1832, s. 2, evidence of 20 years' continuous and uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement establishes a strong presumption that, at some time earlier, there was a (now lost) grant of the easement to the dominant neighbouring estate and that the holder of that estate enjoys the easement as a prescriptively acquired right. The presumption is practically unassailable because it can only be rebutted by proof that the grant could not have been made in the time before the prescription period but after the year 1189 (about which more later). In any event, once user has run for 40 years, the prescriptively acquired right becomes absolute. 21 The second, and for our purposes more important, reason for proceeding with caution is that customs which were understood to bind as customary law were not common law. Blackstone described unwritten -un-enacted -law as falling into three categories: "peculiar laws" (Blackstone had in mind rules of civil and canon law) which "have been … received … by … custom in … courts" with jurisdiction to deal with religious, military, admiralty and university matters but which "bind not the subjects of condemning the king's impositions. 32 A local custom was a tricky proposition. A court enforcing one was in essence declaring a special law to prevail, in the relevant locality, over the general non-statutory law of the land. Judges would understandably be disinclined to make such a declaration without being confident of what the customs of the locality were, and that the alleged custom really did exist.
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The common law, then, was understood to be customary (derived from general custom), but there was also this other category of law -local customs enforced by local and royal courts so as to be binding within a locality -which was customary law but not common law. A "custom cannot be alleged generally within the kingdom", Coke insisted in the late 1620s, "for that is the common law." 34 With the common law -this was the crux of Coke's point -nothing needed to be alleged as custom: law which was common law was by definition within the knowledge of judges, and so there was no reason for lawyers to mention it in writs or pleadings. The point was clearly on Henry Finch's mind when, writing around the same time, he proclaimed mercantile custom to be general custom -part of the common law rather than something which merchants had to demonstrate; it was "not good" legal technique to "plead that there is a custom among merchants throughout the realm" regarding the recognition of bills of exchange, for "that which is current throughout the realm, is common law, not custom." 35 This distinction between common and customary law was not always straightforwardly negotiated, 36 not least because judges had to be confident that a custom prevailed in every locality throughout the realm if it was to be treated as common law. 37 The common law did not have to be proved but the presumption that a custom was common law could be rebutted. In section III, this point is raised in relation to customs presumed immemorial. Here, it is worth noting that a custom considered common law could lose this status if it became evident that the custom did not prevail in every locality, even though it prevailed in nearly every locality, throughout the nevertheless conceived of the distinction long before the mid-sixteenth century, by which point they were drawing it regularly.
III. TESTING CUSTOM
What were the criteria of validity by which a lawyer could identify custom as law? Prestare decisis common lawyers were certainly not in perfect agreement on what the criteria were. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern, in English legal literature from the thirteenth through to the seventeenth century, some recurrent insights regarding how a custom might have the force of law without this force having been conferred on it by an appropriate authority. These insights, though they have little direct bearing on legal systems which recognise customary law but which make no pretense to antiquity, 39 are valuable for anyone intent on understanding customary law in the abstract because they illustrate how the identification of custom as law in its own right depends upon a workable test distinguishing custom which has this status from custom which is merely spontaneous or which has been made into law.
Longevity is sometimes considered to be the relevant test: a custom with the status of law is, on this account, a shared pattern of behaviour converging around a norm which is recognizable as a legal norm because that pattern of behaviour has persisted undisturbed for a long time. (C 7 . 45. 13), it was accepted that "customs and usage" should guide judicial rulings "where we have no applicable written law" (D 1. 3. 32 (Julian)). If an opinion had been repeated it was custom, and so, in the absence of written law, it could be cited as legal authority. 48 The number of decades depending on the type of custom; the period appears never to have been less than ten years, and never more than forty. The answer is somewhat complicated. Medieval real actions for the recovery of possession of land (seisin) were subject to limitation by past events. In the late twelfth century, a claimant seeking to recover had to trace a right of seisin from ancestors who had held that right since, but not before, the accession of Henry I (5 August 1100).
Around 1200, the reference point for establishing rightful seisin was changed to 1
December 1135 (the day of Henry I's death). hereditaments. 52 Early year book cases quite often concern testimony "from time whereof there is no memory" (du temps dount il ny ad memorie). 53 Sometimes there is no basis for inferring anything other than that judges were interpreting this phrase literally:
as meaning "beyond the memory of anyone still alive". But sometimes they took the phrase to mean something else: "before the beginning of the reign of Richard I". Just what it meant to say that a custom had prescribed because it was beyond memory differed depending on whether the custom was local or general. When lawyers and judges referred to an immemorial local custom (or to an incorporeal right having been acquired by virtue of the doctrine of prescription) they originally meant that there was nothing to contradict testimony that the custom (or the enjoyment on which a prescription claim was founded) had continued without interruption since 1189. It seems unlikely that actual evidence of continuous user since this date would have been treated as a prerequisite to ruling that a local custom had prescribed, even in the late-thirteenth century, for providing such evidence was for the most part practically impossible.
Certainly there were indications, by around the second half of the fourteenth century, 52 The association of a statutory limitation date with the limit of legal memory starts to become particularly evident from around 1300 - But general customs were treated differently. The common law was regularly described as immemorial general custom, 60 and Blackstone wrote of "a rule of the common law" being proved "by showing that it has always been the custom to observe it." 61 But the antiquity, as with the certainty and the reasonableness, of a general custom did not have to be proved. 62 Rather, its antiquity was accepted unless somehow disproved. Even though English common law to this day treats the coronation of Richard I as the date distinguishing time beyond from time within legal memory, the requirement that there be evidence of continued practice or usage for a distinct period of time was never applied to customs from which the common law itself was derived.
Prescribed local custom conformed to the rule of recognition: a local custom bound as an exception to the common law because a jury thought it possible, from the 56 57 The question of whether it had been established was for a jury, and jurors were not instructed that a standard fixed amount of time must pass before they could conclude that a custom had been proved beyond living memory. Sixty years was usually (though not always) considered a sufficient amount of time. Sometimes the period would be shorter. A range of instances is set out in Baker, "Prescriptive Customs in English Law, 1300-1800" (note 38 above). 58 See Coke, 1 Institutes 113b. 59 See Blackstone, 1 Commentaries 77-8. Although it was accepted that local customs had to be reasonable if they were to bind as law -see e.g. Littleton, Tenures (note 55 above), at p. 37; also the Case of Tanistry (note 31 above), at p. 32 -a binding local custom was enforced as customary law at variance with the common law (see Littleton, op. cit., at p. 81). Since the common law itself was understood to be inherently reasonable (a point considered below), a court which enforced a local custom was in effect allowing a practice deemed reasonable in a locality (typically, a manor) to take priority over a custom considered reasonable throughout the realm. 60 evidence available to the court, to identify that custom as having governed some state of affairs in some particular locality since time immemorial. Since the antiquity of a general custom did not have to be proved for it to be common law, how was the common law to be identified? The custom that carriers of goods compensate owners for damage incurred in transit might be accepted as general and immemorial, as might the custom that a woman takes a man's surname on marrying him. Why should only one of these customs be recognised as part of the common law? Some customs were immemorial and general yet -Austin, we have seen, was wise to the point -not legally significant. Did not the conformity of a general custom to the requirements of the rule of recognition have to entail more than assuming the custom to have persisted since time beyond memory?
Pre-stare decisis common lawyers seem not to have been exercised by this matter. Hayek observes that the immemorial customs affirmed as common law are ones which "give rise to expectations that guide people's actions" and about which "arbitrators … have to decide." 63 These customs answer disputes which litigants bring to the courts, and the fact that the customs answer litigants' disputes is something the litigants themselves should have been able to ascertain (when a court determines that a custom "ought to have guided their expectations", it does so "not because anyone had told them before that this was the rule, but because this was the established custom which they ought to have known"
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). If a court is presented with a novel legal problem, it might have to declare as common law an immemorial custom which has never before received judicial affirmation or been accorded any legal significance -the late-medieval royal court which had no statute or charter to guide it when determining if a writ should be upheld, for example, would ascertain the parties' rights and obligations in accordance with long-remembered, long-operative common practices. 65 English common lawyers dwelled not on whether immemorial general customs without any apparent legal significance could be latent common law -the answer, implicit in the declaratory theory of the common law, had to be affirmative -but rather on whether the antiquity of a custom which was legally significant spoke to its quality as well as to its status as law.
Fortescue put the point pithily. The king, ruling by hereditary right, had the power to interfere with the immemorial customs of the realm. Yet he showed little inclination to do this. Why? Because the king reasonably inferred, from the fact of these customs having endured, that they were "the best" laws possible; had they not been the best, Davies claimed, but, unlike enacted law, its "iteration and multiplication" -the fact that "people … use it and practise it again and again" -shows it to be "agreeable to their nature and disposition".
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The common lawyer's primary observation was not, however, that the endurance of an immemorial general custom showed that people valued and availed themselves of it. Rather, it was that the custom could thereby be seen to be reasonable: a general custom has the status of common law because it is custom which has continued since time immemorial, and it would not have continued thus if it was somehow contrary to Hale (note 23 above), at p. 4; and see also the more nuanced analysis (emphasizing that common law "on this side the Norman's entrance" was more likely to be new law as opposed to law "kept up from the time of the Saxons") in John Selden, Jani Anglorum facies altera (London 1610), 7-8 (unnumbered pages). 68 Davies (note 60 above), vol. II, at p. 252, also ibid., at pp. 254-5 ("the common law of the land … is … framed and fitted to the nature and disposition of this people …"); and Hale (note 23 above), at p. 30 ("the common municipal law of this kingdom … is singularly accommodated … to the disposition of the English nation, and such as by a long experience and use is as it were incorporated into their very temperament"). 69 reason, 71 those who came after him were more inclined to connect general custom to a type of reason which they considered distinctive to law. Their argument linked the reasonableness of a custom to its use: a general custom was common law because, for so long as anyone could remember, it had governed an issue over which people would sometimes dispute, and if the custom had not governed that issue reasonably it would have fallen by the wayside long ago. Understanding general custom as law, Coke and others maintained, required long study, observation and experience -the "artificial" perfection of reason. 72 But the better description for general custom itself (as opposed to lawyerly erudition on the subject) was "tried" reason. This idea, though it can be traced at least to the Elizabethan era 73 (and though it would in due course be associated with Burkean political thought), was particularly prevalent in the first half of the seventeenth century. Custom, on this view, was tested by "time, … the trier of truth, author of all human wisdom, learning and knowledge", 74 "proved and approved by continual experience to be good and profitable for the commonwealth"; 75 if a custom "had been found inconvenient at any time", it would have "been interrupted, and" so would have "lost the virtue and force of a law". 76 Not every late-Renaissance English lawyer endorsed this notion of general custom as tried reason, 77 and those who did endorse it were essentially refining the standard argument that the customs of the realm were immemorial and innately reasonable. It was a significant refinement, nevertheless, because it reveals common lawyers not confining their explanation of the status of a general custom as common law to the custom having persisted time out of mind. General custom identified as tried reason was common law because its application was not limited to particular places within the realm, because it was immemorial, and because lawyers and judges understood it -from learning, argument, memory and experience -to be both the reason that people behaved (and expected others to behave) in a particular way and a court's justification for ruling as it did on a dispute.
IV. REASONING FROM PRESCRIPTION
It is bewildering, Austin thought, that people's knowledge of the existence of the common law should depend on "the testimony of the judges", given that the general customs associated with the common law were ones which "people had observed" over a long time. 78 The bewilderment endures only if one understands judges to be supplying testimony as to the existence of common law rules rather than deciding if the rules apply abjuring that action had been tested over time but because the wrongfulness of that action was self-evident. For Austin, the presumption that a general custom declared common law must have persisted since time beyond memory was simply unwarranted, because many such customs (he gave the example of bills of exchange) were very obviously of modern provenance.
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Bentham and Austin belonged to the era when the association of the common law with general custom was very much in demise and its association with the doctrine of precedent in the ascendancy. Custom was exiting the stage even as it was being ushered off. What was being ushered off was, to recall Lord Reid's description, the performance of a fairy tale -a tale about judges who, on appointment, learned the secret formula which gave them entry to the cave containing the common law's treasure. positivists insisted (and the received wisdom is that they were right to insist 82 ) that the tale was far-fetched.
But was it? Certainly the declaratory theory is historically inaccurate if it is reduced to the proposition that judges never develop but only declare the common law.
But a better estimation of the theory is perhaps that judges, in deciding on disputes between parties, have a primary responsibility to identify and apply the laws governing those disputes when the parties acted. 83 A court settling a dispute by reference to (local or general) custom would not be purporting to make that custom into law but rather identifying the custom as the law already in place to be applied to the dispute. If, when the parties acted, the law already in place was the custom -if there was no other law that could be identified as governing the dispute -the court is supposed to apply that law.
Should you put your cattle out to graze on my land by virtue of local custom, and a court then penalises me because I build a fence which stops you doing this, I might object that the penalty is unfair because I had no way of knowing, at the time that I built the fence, and burdens of prescribed local customs are enjoyed and borne by communities. 84 It is presumed, furthermore, that a right acquired by a person through prescription was the subject of a lawful grant at some point preceding legal memory; all that can be proved is that the mode of user or enjoyment which occasions the prescriptive claim has prevailed openly, without force and without interruption -in other words as if, at some point in the past, the right was lawfully granted. A local custom, by contrast, prescribes not to the benefit of any specific (actual or juridical) person but rather to an amorphous community which, having no legal personality, cannot have rights conferred on it. And so whereas rights acquired by prescription are taken to have originated lawfully, "custom to some place … cannot be by grant". 85 Yet despite these differences between custom and prescription, lawyers from Bracton's time to Coke's are regularly to be found referring to local custom having prescribed, by which they meant that a custom had the force of law because it had been proved to have endured since time immemorial. The year books provide numerous instances of local customs being enforced because nobody alive could provide testimony contradicting long and continuous user, 86 just as they attest to occasions when local customs were adjudged not to bind because they had not prescribed. 87 General customs, we know, were assumed extant since the coronation of Richard I -their status as immemorial custom was notional rather than proved. Judicial proclamations regarding immemorial general customs could sometimes seem rather eccentric. In 1606, for example, Coke declared digging for saltpeter for the manufacture of gunpowder to be a custom of the realm, even though gunpowder production in Britain did not start until around the mid-fourteenth century. 88 For classical positivists, examples of this type were but demonstrations that the common law had to be judgemade. For the declaratory theorist, by contrast, they are evidence that judges can go awry -that they not only might mangle but (if they are identifying a custom as law for the first time) might even be expected to mangle the secret formula which opens the cave. 89 The judiciary is "sworn to determine" the "customs of the land" correctly, Blackstone argued, but if they do so incorrectly (if they make "determination[s] … evidently contrary to reason") they do not make law but rather make determinations which are "not law… not the established custom of the realm" -and a future court ruling on an allegation concerning the purported custom has the responsibility to "vindicate" the common law "from misrepresentation." [I]t is easy to jump to the conclusion that the norm already regulates the present situation when in reality it is still indeterminate in respect to its regulation or nonregulation of the present situation." John Gardner, " struck him as a preposterous notion. 93 As for general custom, it seemed obvious to him that some parts of the common law had, by the early seventeenth century, become "obsolete and worn out of use: … judges found them to be unmeete for the time they lived in." 94 to apply as law, in other words, there has to be a practice which States have freely concurred in or converged on, and those States must also believe (the so-called opinio iuris requirement) that this practice is legally binding. While "it seems difficult to accept" that "prescription is part of treaty law" 99 if the applicability of international custom depends on evidence that a general practice which States accept as law has existed undisturbed since a time beyond legal memory, Verykios argues, prescription is a feature of treaty law if customs need not be immemorial in order to prescribe: so long as we "carefully distinguish … immemorial prescription" from the "actual prescription" (prescription proprement dite) of international custom, 100 we might conclude that "prescription is … a general legal principle as part of international law under art. 38". . 100 Ibid., at pp. 44-5. 101 Ibid., at p. 50.
For Verykios, the "actual" prescribing of an international custom occurs through its maturation over time. 102 Justice Gray famously endorsed this idea in The Paquete
Habana: "[b]y an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels … have been recognized as exempt … from capture as prize of war." 103 Actual prescription deems it irrelevant when a custom ripened into law. The crucial question is whether the custom's state of ripeness can be determined "at the moment the appreciation is being made" by the court issuing a ruling. 104 "[I]t is not often that we need to know at precisely what moment the fruit became ripe: we are more interested in knowing, when we bite it, if it is now ripe or still too hard or sour." 105 The analogy is question begging. A court does not make a determination for its own purpose but rather resolves a dispute between party A, who believes that a custom is ripe, and party B, who believes the opposite. For the court to rule in favour of either side on the basis of its "appreciation" of the custom's ripeness leaves the losing side with no explanation as to why its belief that the custom had (or had not) ripened into law was incorrect. 106 If the court is not simply to take a side but rather to apply a custom as law (or decline to apply it because it is not law), it must rely on a standard distinguishing customary law from mere custom. Immemorial prescription is such a standard. "Actual" prescription is not.
If a custom is a rule of a legal system, it must conform to the requirements of the rule of recognition: there has to be some test of legal validity enabling legal officials to distinguish that custom from custom simpliciter. Immemorial prescription is not the only conceivable standard. In international law, for example, the standard is more likely to be formulated in terms of a practice being shared rather than having endured: solving and avoiding interaction and co-ordination problems in the international community requires clarity (to take the example from The Paquete Habana) on whether fishing vessels are exempt from capture as prize of war; many States might agree that it is inappropriate to capture these vessels and might believe that they have a legal obligation not to do so; and the agreement among and belief shared by these States might be sufficiently widespread to warrant the judgment that there is a rule of customary international law forbidding the capture of fishing vessels. For the custom on exemption from capture to function as a rule of customary international law, however, these States will have to concur on, among
other things, what constitutes sufficiently widespread (as well as sufficiently longstanding) agreement on the inappropriateness of capture, and the extent to which States -and indeed, which States -must believe that their navies are under a duty not to treat fishing vessels as prize of war. 107 As with prescription, so too with convergence: it cannot be part of the rule of recognition if the identification of custom as law is deemed possible by subjective assessment, without the need to satisfy the requirements of some standard of legal validity.
V. CONCLUSION
English lawyers in the centuries separating Bracton and Coke understood (even if they might not have articulated the proposition) that if a custom was to be declared already law, there had to be some criterion or criteria of validity enabling a court to identify that custom thus. To state that prescription was the recognised criterion perhaps simplifies matters inordinately. What it meant to say that a custom had prescribed did not remain unaltered from one context to the next, and claims as to a custom's antiquity sometimes seemed to be but pretexts for other claims (regarding custom as the embodiment of tried reason, for example, or as suited to a community's dispositions). Prescription was, nevertheless, regularly invoked by judges and lawyers to explain how customs could have the force of law without having been legalised by the judiciary or Parliament, and how the court which treated such a custom as dispositive when ruling on a dispute could be said to be enforcing law which already existed rather than turning a custom into law and applying that law retrospectively.
Classical positivists offered a searching critique of this position -a critique which only the rash would dismiss outright. But this does not mean that we do well to join those positivists in concluding that custom which is law could only ever be custom turned into law. When declaring a custom to be law, judges were affirming that the custom satisfied a standard of legal validity which existed as custom in foro. A community custom which had prescribed was considered to satisfy a test identifiable not as a judgemade or statutory rule -though the classic formulation of the test was derived from a limitation statute -but rather as the judiciary's and the legal profession's broad and
